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Appendix:
The teleservice scenario: Since manufacturing takes place in the city and thuswe obtain from equation(11)again
Since the question for the service firm is whether to move to the city, the wage change is
given by w/w*. In addition transport costs no longer accrue. Thus, the relative value of
sales of the relocating firmis given by
Therefore relocation is profitable if
The service city scenario: With manufacturing in the provinces and services in the city
we have and . Together with equation(11) this changes equation
(14)to
Since the question for the service firm is again whether to move to the provinces, the
relative wage is w*/w and transport costs are zero. Thus, the relative value of sales of the
relocating firm   is given by
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teleworking costs. This would transform the envsioned service city into a virtual city if
not service firms deny their employees teleworking. They might have an incentive to do
so if agglomeration externalities vanish when their employees telework and thereby save
the service city.–15–
that the agglomeration externalities vanish if all service workers engage in teleworking.
Therefore service producers have an incentive to deny their employees this possible use
of the information highway and thereby save the city.
IV. Summary
In this paper we have studied possible consequences from building an information
highway for the location of economic activity in the framework of a Krugman (1991)
type model of economic geography. We have identified these advancements in
information and communication technology with a decrease in transportation costs for
intermediate services in the first part and as a decrease in teleworking costs in the second.
Starting from a situation where all production (except agriculture) is concentrated in the
city, building an information highway might induce firms as well as households to
relocate to the provinces. Firms can be lured by lower wages and households by the
combination of lower living costs and the possibility to keep the higher city wage. While
low communication costs are necessary for a relocation process to start, they are not
sufficient. For service firms relocation is only profitable if the fall in costs due to lower
wages outweighs the communication costs. For households, in turn, lower (relative)
wages in the provinces are only acceptable if transport costs for the agricultural produce
are high and those for industrial goods are low. If costs of living in the rural region are
low enough, households might even move to the provinces and start teleworking, even if
the firms prefer to remain in the city. For this to occur, the lower living costs must at least
compensate for the costs of teleworking.
A situation with services in the rural area and manufacturing in the city turned out to be
unstable. It is always more profitable for manufacturing firms to relocate to the provinces
since wages are lower and communication costs for intermediate services can be avoided.
The model also makes some predictions about the feasibility of a service city which is a
very popular vision among politicians. This pattern is characterized by a concentration of
services in the urban and a spread of manufacturing over the rural region. Such an
equilibrium is only feasible if positive locational externalities for the service producers
from locating close to each other are large enough to offset the gains from locating closer
to their customers, the providers of consumption goods. Without this additional ‘ad hoc’
assumption of agglomeration externalities, the service city is not a stable equilibrium.
Furthermore, even if such a technological externality exists for firms, households will
move to the provinces whenever the information highway leads to a sufficient decrease in–14–
Consider the city case first: all firms and workers - except agricultural - are located in
the city. A houshold decides to move to the provinces if its real income as city dweller
(city wage divided by city price level) is smaller than his real income as rural dweller
(city wage adjusted for the costs of teleworking divided by rural price level). Defining a
new variable nH* as real disposable rural to urban income, the condition to move to the
provinces is given as
Taking into account thatandsimplifies the condition to:
(22)
Equation (22) shows that a fall in tH, the cost of teleworking, increases  , thus making
a relocation decision more advantageous. Note however, that such a decrease is not
sufficient to make the city equilibrium for households unstable: If transportation costs for
manufactures are large relative to those for agricultural products and if their share in
consumption,  g, is relatively large, then   can be smaller unity even with no
teleworking costs (tH = 1). In this case the price level in the provinces is higher than in
the city and households prefer to stay in the urban region. 
Now, consider the service city scenario. All service production takes place in the city and
all manufacturing in the provinces. We have already noted above that such an
equilibrium is only sustainable if positive technological location externalities for service
production exist. Since only service workers can make use of the information highway,
the household decision to discuss is that of a service household in the city thinking of
moving into the rural area. Similarly to the discussion above, it will do so if
(23)
If there are any transportation costs for the final output goods and if the information
highway will decrease the cost of long-distance work sufficiently, the service workers
will move to the rural area. Service firms, however, will remain in the city as long as the
locational externalities are large enough. As consequence, the service city becomes a
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III. Locational Patterns and Teleworking
So far we have always assumed that workers live in the region of their employment. The
main focus was therefore on the location of production. However, one of the first things
coming to peoples’ minds when discussing possible consequences from the information
highway is an increase in teleworking activity: Workers are enabled to conduct their
work from home, which could reduce commuting activity and might even lead to
migration from cities to the rural area (or the other way round). We will confine ourselves
to the migration consequence in this section and discuss the workers’ choice of location
for housing in the same way as we have analyzed the firms’ location decisions above.
This is done by reconsidering the two locational scenarios from the previous section
which turned out to be possibly stable for firms (metropolis and service city) and
introduce the possibility to telework.
Suppose that the conditions for stability of locational patterns derived in the previous
section are met. In this case there are currently no incentives for firms to change their
location. Suppose further that initially all workers live in the area where their employer
produces. Now the information highway is set up and makes it possible for individuals to
move to a ’nicer’ place to live - which means a cheaper place - while keeping their
occupation and meeting their obligations via teleworking. If an individual worker has an
incentive to move, the household location pattern is said to be unstable. Due to such
household relocation the firm location pattern changes, too. More manufacturing output
is then produced in the target region of household relocation and less in the source
region. This, in turn, influences the decision of service producers who want to locate
close to their customer base.
We assume for simplicity that only service workers can engage in teleworking and
manufacturing workers have to be physically present. Furthermore it is assumed that
teleworking is costly and that firms are indifferent about the teleworking decisions of
their employees. Since there are also no productivity differences between both types of
workers (teleworking and not teleworking), firms pay both types the same wage:
households must bear the costs of teleworking themselves which is modelled in the way
that the net wage for a teleworking individual is only a fraction 1/tH of the wage for an
employee living close to his workplace.5 
5. This poses the question who builds the information highway and how the costs appear in the
economy again as expenses. We abstract from this point and simply assume that service workers
can spend their wages either on goods or on the information highway.–12–
equations (1) - (8) and (11) could be simplified to a system of equations in
, where the tilde denotes the relation of city versus provincial
value for the respective variable. This system of equations has been solved numerically
with the parameter values g = 0.6, s = 5, bI = 4, and aI = 20 which should be reasonable
values. Figure 1 shows the regional distribution of labora s a measure for the relative
size of both regions for three different simulations. In the first run we have chosen
m = 0,7 and tA = 1.4. In the second run, m has been decreased to m = 0.5 and in the third tA
has been raised to tA = 2
Figure 1: Communication Costs and the Regional Distribution of Labor.
First of all, the simulations show that a fall in the cost of communication leads to a less
urbanized economy - just as it raises the inclination of service firms in the service city
scenario to relocate to the provinces. Furthermore, a comparsion of the different curves
shows that with large transport costs for agricultural goods a decrease in cc leads to a
larger relocation to the provinces than with a lower tA. Likewise, the larger m, the share of
intermediate services in manufacturing production, the stronger is the reaction ofto a
change in communication cost cc. Overall, the long-run outcome in this model is even a
worse scenario for cities in the presence of an information-highway than the short-run.
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This outcome might come as a surprise to inhabitants of a ‘service metropolis’ like New
York or London and as a disappointment to mayors of cities like Berlin that see their
city’s future in becoming a service city. A factor that can make such a scenario an
equilibrium are technological externalities which, however, are a quite elusive concept.
Nevertheless, it is often argued that positive non-pecuniary agglomeration externalities
exist for certain services like research or financial services. Production costs of these
services are said to be lower whenever many similar producers gather together at a single
place than in a situation where they produce far away from others.
We can introduce such externalities in a rather simple way into the model and then
reconsider the decision problem for a service firm: Assume that variable production costs
in the city, where service firms produce in close proximity, are only a fraction h as large
as in the provinces. Then a firm which wants to move to the rural region, looses its cost
advantage. Therefore in the metropolis scenario equation(15)changes into
(20)
Thus, the smaller h, implying a more important locational externality, the smaller .
The stability of the city equilibrium is affirmed by the externality.
The externality has no influence on the second equilibrium, the teleservice scenario. For
the decision of a single service firm it does not matter whether it produces alone in the
provinces or is the single producer in the city. A critical mass of service producers in the
city would be necessary for positive externalities to exist.
Last, in the service city scenario condition(19)changes into:
(21)
It is easy to see that a small h (large externalities) can bring  below unity even with
transport and communication costs and therefore make the service city a stable
equilibrium. Thus, a service city might indeed be a policy option if only the externalities
are large enough. However, compared to the pecuniary externalities linking manufactures
and consumers as well as manufactures and service firms, the assumption of
agglomeration externalities is probably a strong one.
So far the results have been derived from studying certain illustrative situations. To
derive the long-run outcome, the model has been solved numerically for a variety of
parameter values. To keep things as simple as possible, it has been assumed that
transportation costs for industrial goods are large enough to prevent any of the regions
from becoming the sole producer of manufacturing goods. With this assumption
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From this condition follows that the teleservice scenario cannot constitute a stable
situation. It will always be advantageous to satisfy the provinces’ demand for
manufactures through local production. By relocating to the rural area, manufacturing
not only has access to cheaper services but also can pay lower wages which households
are willing to accept since no transport costs for agricultural goods accrue.
For completeness consider the decision of a service firm located in the provinces. For
such a firm it is profitable to move to the city if the following condition, derived in the
appendix, is met:
(17)
As before, the influence of communication costs on v can be seen easily. First note that
without transport costs for agricultural goods it will always be profitable for a services
firm to move into the city and thus the teleservice scenario cannot constitute an
equilibrium. This result is analogous to the previous scenario where with tA = 1 a services
firm will never leave the city because it wants to locate close to its customers, the
manufactures firms. This desire is increased by a larger cc, implying a higher v: The
larger communication costs are, the tighter is the regional link between manufactures and
services.
Last consider the scenario of a ‘service city’. All services are concentrated in the city
while all manufacturing takes place in the provinces. For manufacturing production to be
confined to the provinces, it must be the case that . In the sam e way as above
this condition can be rewritten as
(18)
Thus, if  tA is large enough and  cc is small enough, this equilibrium is stable. The
introduction of an information highway even strengthens this equilibrium by reducing
communication costs and thus prices of services produced in the city. For these service
firms it is profitable to move to the provinces if the following condition (derived in the
appendix) is met:
(19)
Inspection of condition  (19) shows that the ‘service city’ can  never constitute an
equilibrium as long as there are any transport costs. It will always be advantageous for a
service producer to relocate to the provinces to be closer to its customers.
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To make the relocation profitable, this change in value must be larger than the change in
fix costs which are given by w*/w. Defining a new variableand using
equation(14)we get as condition for a relocation to be profitable
(15)
As long as , the service firm will remain in the city. First of all note that a
necessary assumption for a profitable relocation are transport costs for agriculture
(tA > 1). From equation(14) it is obvious that only with tA > 1 the rural wage can be
lower than the urban wage rate. With all manufacturing concentrated in the city, a lower
rural wage is the only incentive for a service producer to relocate. From equation(15)the
effects of other transport costs onar e also easy to see. A larger tM decreaseswhich
is also a wage effect as equation(14)shows: Th e larger transport costs for manufactures
are, the higher must relative rural wages be to compensate agricultural workers for the
high costs of satisfying their demand for manufactures. The influence of cc is also clear:
the larger communication costs are, the lower is . Hence, in the metropolis scenario
the information highway will decrease the threshold which keeps service firms in the
city.
Summarizing both stability conditions for the metropolis scenario leads to the conclusion
that the set-up of an information highway might indeed unbalance a situation with all
service and industrial production concentrated in the city by loosening the linkage
between manufactures and service firms. However, it is not clear from the analytical
discussion whether service or manufacturing firms leave the city first. This depends on
the parameter values. In any case, if the relocation process has started, it leads to
adjustments in all variables of this general equilibrium model. Therefore information
about the final general equilibrium outcome can only be obtained from numerical
simulations like those conducted below.
We can now ask whether other situations constitute stable locations of economic activity.
Let us turn to the teleservice scenario first. We assume that by some historic event all
services production is now located in the rural area whereas all manufactures production
takes place in the city and the question is whether this can be a stable situation.
Manufacturing will remain to be confined to the city if , just as in the
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Making use of equation (11) as well as the derived term for this condition
becomes after some rearrangements
(13)
Obviously, if tM and tA are small enough and cc is large enough, such an equilibrium is
sustainable for manufacturing. A decrease in cc on the other hand can make this situation
unstable since the falling communication cost decreases the price of city services in the
provinces leading to lower prices for potential manufacturing production there and
possibly to a set-up of manufacturing firms in the provinces.
Consider next the service firms. An individual firm will only move to the provinces if
wages are lower and if the increase in the value of its sales from lower wages is large
enough to offset the decrease caused by falling demand from city manufacturers which is
due to higher communication costs cc. In this case it could make profits by moving. Since
service firms mark up prices over marginal cost, they will change the price of their output
proportional to the cost change. The latter is only a change in wages which can be
derived from equation(11)  noting that no service and manufacturing production takes
place in the provinces and thus the price of manufactures in the provinces is given as
.
(14)
Suppose that the number of firms, n, is large. Then the relocation decision of a single
service firm does only have a negligible effect on the price index of the service
composite. However, since the service produced by the relocated firm now incurrs
communication costs, the price of each unit that arrives increases by cc. The overall price
change will affect the number of products sold with an elasticity –s and the firm’s value
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II. The Information Highway and Locational Patterns for Firms
The information highway is in this section identified with a decrease in communication
costs, which can reflect different phenomena: A financial advice, for example, given bya
distant financial services company and delivered by mail, might be somewhat outdated
upon arrival. Modern telecommunication technique decreases this delay cost through
almost instant delivery. Also a remote consulting firm delivering only a written report
gets less of its message accross than one that can discuss critical issues in video
conferences. Here also does the information highway decrease costs from lost
information. As a last example consider remote diagnosis and troubleshooting of
production equipment. This reduces output loss due to a quicker reaction and decreases
the diagnosis cost by reducing the need for repair personnel to travel to the defect
equipment.
As discussed above, the information highway makes distant production of services less
disadvantageous. We will discuss this effect here in the context of a short-run equilibrium
by analyzing the stability of three illustrative, albeit somewhat extreme scenarios. The
first situation to be discussed is a concentration of manufactures and intermediate
producers in the city with only agriculture remaining in the rural region. We call this the
‘metropolis scenario’. Next is a situation where intermediate services are produced in the
rural region and manufactures in the city. We call this the ‘teleservice scenario’. The last
situation is just the opposite: intermediates are being produced in the city and
manufactures in the provinces. This constitutes the ‘service city’.
It is assumed that the economy has arrived at one of these scenarios for reasons not
discussed here. Such situation is said to constitute a short-run equilibrium if it is
compatible with the regional pattern of manufacturing production as given in equation
(4) and if no service firm has an incentive to move to another region. Note that several
equilibria are feasible in principle, possibly also with labor and firms split between
regions in a different way than discussed here. 
Consider first manufacturing in the metropolis scenario. This sector is concentrated in the
city and exports to the provinces. Such a situation can only constitute an equilibrium if
, i.e., if provincial consumers buy the city goods in spite of transport costs
instead of producing the industrial goods for the potential pricein their own region.
Using equations(2),(1) , and their respective counterparts for the provinces as well as
taking into account that no service production takes place in the rural area, this condition






Labor in both occupations must sum to the total labor force in this region:
(9)
Equations(1)-(9) describe the city ’s economy and yield a solution conditional on L. The
same applies to the provinces except that equation(9) changes to
and  depends on agricultural production: We assume this sector to be perfectly
competitive and to be characterized by constant returns to the only input labor. Withth
e share of total expenditure in each region going to agriculture and transport
cost for agriculture such that , th e labor force employed in this sector can be
derived as
(10)
Perfect labor mobility between regions will assure that real wages in both regions are
equal. Using  , real wage equality implies that
(11)
Last, labor employed in both regions has to sum up to the total labor force which we
normalize to unity:
(12)
Equations  (1) - (9) and their respective counterparts for the provinces describe the
equilibrium together with equations (10) - (12). They could – at least in principle – be
solved for all variables to yield the long-run equilibrium. However, although the model is
fairly simple, it is already too complex to accomplish this. Therefore the model is only
solved numerically at the end of the following section to discuss effects of parameter
changes like a decrease in communication costs on the long-run outcome. Before turning
to these simulations, though, we will follow  Krugman (1991) in studying some
illustrating situations by asking under which conditions these can constitute equilibria
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(3)
Demand functions for the manufactured good produced in the city can be derived from
utility maximization as:
(4)
This discontinuity in demand functions for manufactures is due to the assumptions of
transport costs for and homogeneity of manufactured goods produced in either region. As
soon as imported goods become cheaper (taking into account transport costs) than those
produced in the own region, demand will switch and viceversa.4 The services sector,
which produces the intermediates, consists of a variety of firms producing incompletely
substitutable services under monopolistic competition. With fixed cost of service
production aI > 0, each firm produces services for the own region (yI) as well as for
export (xI). Contrary to manufacturing, the services sector uses only labor as input. Total
costs for each firm are given by:
Since labor is perfectly mobile between occupations, the wage rate w must be the same in
all occupations within a region. Profit maximizing implies that prices are set as mark-up
over marginal cost:
(5)
and a zero profit condition determines the size of service producers as
(6)
Due to the zero-profit condition all revenue from service production goes to labor as
wages:
(7)
The demand for each single variety of the intermediate good can be derived from the cost
function of manufacturing firms and the price index for services(1)as:
4. In principle the incontinuities could be avoided by introducing a variety of industrial goods
produced under monopolistic competition. However, this only increases the model complexity
without yielding any insight beyond that already derived by Krugman (1991).
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price of manufactures, and U utility. With these preferences, g is also the share of
manufactures in consumers’ total expenditure wL. The latter is given by the wage rate w
times the total labor force employed in the city, L.
Manufacturing firms produce their output from labor and a variety of differentiated
intermediate services. These services are aggregated by a CES technology into a
composite with the following price index PI where s > 1 is the elasticity of demand for a
single variety:
(1)
The city produces n varieties of services which in equilibrium are sold at the same price
pI. Similarly, the provinces produce   varieties and sell them at a price  . However,
using services produced in the other region involves communication costs cc. These are
assumed to take the form of Samuelson’s iceberg transportation cost, where the costs are
incurred in the produce. Of each information unit brought on its way only a fraction 1/cc
arrives. We will assume later that the information highway enters the model via this
communication cost by decreasing cc and therefore making location less relevant.
Each manufacturing firm can produce goods for the same region (yM) and for export to
the other region (xM), in this case the provinces. However, since the output goods
produced in both regions are identical, in equilibrium either both regions produce their
own manufactures or one of the regions will become the sole producer of these goods.
The latter will take place if transport costs for manufactures tM (which are also assumed
to be of iceberg form) are lower than the price difference between goods manufactured in
the city and those produced in the provinces.
Production of industrial goods takes place by combining labor and intermediates using a
Cobb-Douglas technique with intermediate share m, where 0 < m < 1. There are variable
costs of production of bM > 0 input units per output unit. Then total costs for a firm in this
sector are
In equilibrium price equals marginal cost:
(2)
Since factors are paid their marginal product,  of the revenue goes to labor
employed in this sector:
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highway, the model is extended in a second step to allow for the case where service
workers can use the information infrastructure to work from their homes in a distant firm.
This is the situation typically understood as teleworking. The model modification thus
captures the consequences of the information highway for the location of households.
The paper is organized as follows: In the first section the model’s structure is derived. In
section II we analyze feasibility and stability of some illustrative short-run equilibria for
the location of firms when an information highway is being build and discuss long-run
effects by means of numerical simulations. Section III derives the spatial consequences
for household location when teleworking is possible. Section IVconcludes.
I. The Model
The model, which is based on the monopolistic competition framework proposed by
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), is a variant of the economic geography models introduced by
Krugman (1991) and later extended for example by Krugman and Venables (1995).
Within this framework our economy consists of two regions: an urban region – the city –
and a rural region – the provinces – which spans the remainder of the economy. In both
regions two sorts of goods can be produced: identical manufactures or industrial goods,
which are produced from labor and a set of intermediate goods with constant returns, as
well as these intermediate goods, which are produced under monopolistic competition
from labor. The intermediate goods are thought of as describing production services like
consulting, accounting, research, information services, etc. A third good, agriculture, is
produced only from labor with constant returns. We assume that an agricultural sector
only exists in the provinces, not in the city. Labor is perfectly mobile between all regions
and occupations. In most of the paper it is assumed that workers live where they work
which excludes commuting or teleworking. We will relax this assumption lateron for a
short discussion of possible consequences from teleworking.
To keep the model as simple as possible, production technologies and preferences are
assumed to be the same in the urban and rural region. For ease of exposition only the city
is described wherever possible below. Analogous conditions hold for the provinces. The
three sectors agriculture, manufactures, and intermediates are denoted by subscripts A,
M, and I, respectively. Where present, rural variables are denoted by an asterisk.
The city is populated by representative consumers receiving only labor income. Their
preferences for agricultural and industrial goods are given by a Cobb-Douglas





influences on traffic and transportation. When these technologies emerged in the 1970s,
they were seen as a possible substitute for commuting and business traffic, promising a
reduction of congestion problems.2Thus, a large part of the literature is concerned with
teleworking and video conferencing. The empirical evidence about these technologies,
however, is mixed. The demand for teleworking as well as video conferencing has been
rather low so far, partly due to unfavorable staff attitudes (cf. Bertuglia and Occelli,
1995).
However, from Lenin’s phantasies to the current discussion about Berlin the location
decisions of firms and less those of households are the focus of attention. People like
McLuhan and Ungers argue that information technology leads to a change in thelocation
of economic activity, bringing to an end the concentration of this activity in large cities.
But this is only one one view: Quite contrary to this position, politicians, for example in
Berlin, propagate the ideal of a ‘service city’ as goal of economic policy, also made
possible by the advances in information and communication technologies. By this they
mean a city dominated by a concentration of service sector activity, having in mind the
concentration of financial services in London or New York or other (well-paid) service
activities which serve as input for industrial or other service production. These opposing
views about the future of cities motivate this paper.
The focus on services as an input to industrial production is reflected in the model
presented in the subsequent sections. The basic model describes a Krugman (1991) type
economy consisting of two regions, city and provinces, with two (main) sectors of
production: manufacturing, which produces goods for household consumption, and
services, which are inputs for manufacturing. These services form the main focus of the
analysis as we will identify the information highway with a decrease in communication
and coordiniation costs involved with distant service production. Thus, the information
highway has the effect that distance between service producers and their customers
becomes less relevant. This is the main effect to be discussed in this paper.3 In addition,
since ’teleworking’ is discussed quite heavily in connection with the information
2. This reminds one of the early days of the PC, when it was commonly assumed that computer
technology would lead to the paper-less office.
3. While sharing the motivation, this paper differs considerably from Gaspar’s and Glaeser’s
(1996) recent discussion of „Information Technology and the Future of Cities“. In their model
cities are a means of reducing the fixed costs involved in face-to-face interactions.
Improvements in telecommunications technology lead to substitution of face-to-face by
electronic interaction on the one hand and to an increase in frequency of contact between
individuals possibly resulting in more face-to-face interactions. The overall result then depends
on the question which effect dominates.–1–
Throughout the twentieth century there have been recurrent phases where improvements
in information technology were thought to bring about the end of the city as a
geographical agglomeration of people and firms. In the 1920s Russian constructivists
demanded the dissolution of cities like Moscow as “the modern city is a product of
mercantile society and will die together with it.” (Miliutin, 1930, 56) Cities and countries
should merge through an extensive network of linear settlements, made possible by
modern technology as envisioned by Lenin: “At the present time, when the transmission
of electrical energy over long distances is possible and when the technology of
transportation is improved, there are absolutely no technical obstacles to resettling the
population more or less evenly over the entire country, and still taking advantage of the
treasure houses science and art which have for centuries accumulated in only a few
centers.”1
While these socialist phantasies are planning problems, later prophets regarded the
dissolution of cities as something to happen even without government intervention: In
the technology-obedient 1960s Marshall McLuhan prophesied the famous ‘escape from
New York’ – also made possible by modern technology. Nowerdays, we seem to be in
one of these phases again: The German architect Oswald Matthias Ungers regards his
own work as a “desperate attempt to resurrect urban places” at the “end of the
technological century with super bits and bytes, information highway, Internet, and CD-
ROM”. (Ungers, 1995). Meanwhile several Cassandras warn that the center of Berlin,
which is currently being filled with square miles of office space in a construction boom
as heavy as last seen in the 1870s, will be a ghost town after completion – become
obsolete by e-mail, video conferences, and teleworking.
So far the hype. Within economics the spatial consequences of technological advances in
telecommunications and computing have so far found less interest, and if so mostly at the
level of economic and regional policy (e.g., OECD, 1992) which led the OECD to the
conclusion that „nobody knows how information and communication technologies will
influence the way people and firms use space.“ (De Michelis, 1995, 12) This is rather
astonishing since the adoption of technologies as well as the choice of location follows
largely economic incentives. Availability of new technologies per se does not necessarily
have economic and locational effects.
Furthermore, most of the economic work on possible consequences from new
information and communication technologies focuses on a single aspect, namely on their
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This paper studies possible consequences from building an “information highway” for
the location of firms and households in the context of a two-region, three-good model of
economic geography. The advancements in information and communication technology
are identified with a decrease in transportation costs for intermediate services on the one
hand and with a decrease in the costs of teleworking for households on the other hand.
The stability of three situations is investigated: all production in the city; manufacturing
in the city and services in the rural region; manufacturing in the rural region and services
in the city (service city). While the first situation can constitute a stable equilibrium, the
second cannot and the third is only feasible if additional locational externalities exist for
services in the city. Even then the service city can become a “virtual city“ if costs of
teleworking decrease enough to encourage households to move to the rural region and
telework.
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